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Al-Sisi’s Development Visions 
Projects and Power in Egypt 
Stephan Roll 
Abdul Fatah al-Sisi came out as winner of a highly unfree and unfair presidential elec-
tion held between 26 and 28 May. In office the former military chief now faces great 
challenges. The country’s economy is in ruins and living conditions have tumbled over 
the past three and a half years. But comprehensive economic reforms are not on al-Sisis 
agenda. Instead, during his election campaign, the former army chief proposed gigantic 
development projects. Here he has a particularly firm eye on the interests of his most 
important supporters. Such a course will not improve Egypt’s economic and social 
situation. Germany and Europe should therefore definitely not support the approach 
of the new leadership in Cairo, but instead push for structural reforms in the Egyptian 
economy. 
 
Al-Sisi’s victory came as no surprise. Un-
like his left-populist challenger Hamdeen 
Sabahi, the defence minister was backed 
heavily by the state apparatus and the 
Egyptian media. However, the low turnout, 
which forced the election commission to 
extend voting for a third day, indicates that 
al-Sisi’s real challenges lie after the election. 
Egyptian society is deeply divided and the 
country’s economic situation catastrophic. 
It is under these conditions that al-Sisi will 
have to consolidate his power. As far as the 
lines of conflict in society are concerned, 
al-Sisi already made his position clear as 
army chief: He will tolerate no opposition 
to his authority and will crack down hard 
on political adversaries. Accordingly, state 
repression has already been massively ex-
panded in the recent months. 
With respect to his economic policy 
ideas, al-Sisi long kept his cards close to his 
chest. But facing a budget deficit of more 
than 14 percent of GDP, state debt that now 
exceeds annual GDP, and economic growth 
that is barely keeping pace with population 
growth, he has now made some grand an-
nouncements: In the coming decades Egypt 
is to make a veritable leap out of economic 
penury with a $140 billion development 
programme. He proposes to build 48 new 
cities and tourist resorts, expand transport 
and energy infrastructure and develop 
almost 17,000 square kilometres of desert 
along the Nile. These plans are by no means 
new. But their enormous cost and numer-
ous unanswered questions concerning im-
plementation makes them highly contro-
versial in Egyptian expert circles. Al-Sisi has 
not even made the effort to respond to con-
cerns. To him the development plan prob-
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 ably represents a fictitious framework for 
a series of major projects that might be 
realised, or at least started, in the coming 
period. These include developing the Suez 
Canal Zone into an international industry 
and logistics hub, constructing a high-speed 
rail network and building one million new 
homes. 
Serving Particular Interests 
Behind these major projects stands an ideo-
logical approach that assumes that econo-
mic and social development can be planned 
on the drawing board and implemented 
through state leadership. However, this 
approach seems to be driven first and fore-
most by a logic of power. Al-Sisi has his eye 
on three groups of actors, without whose 
support he cannot consolidate his author-
ity: the Arab Gulf states, Egypt’s military 
and the country’s business elite. 
Gulf Donors 
Without generous financial assistance 
from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait, Egypt would already 
be bankrupt. Directly after the removal of 
Mohammed Morsi by the Egyptian military 
in July 2013 the three Gulf monarchies 
promised about $12 billion in financial 
assistance and energy supplies. According 
to al-Sisi the figure had grown to about 
$20 billion by May 2014. In view of its 
empty state coffers, Egypt will remain de-
pendent on such transfers in the coming 
years. Although the funds from the Gulf 
apparently come without specific formal 
conditions of the kind that would accom-
pany an IMF loan package for example, they 
are not flowing without a quid pro quo. At 
the political level in particular, the UAE 
and Saudi Arabia value the new Egyptian 
leadership as an important partner in their 
fight against the Muslim Brotherhood, 
which they see as a threat to themselves 
too. All three ruling houses also wish to see 
Egypt’s military as an ally in the ongoing 
conflict with Iran. 
Economic interests are at least as impor-
tant. According to the Egyptian govern-
ment, the volume of investments owned by 
Gulf Cooperation Council states in Egypt 
amounted to about $50 billion at the end of 
2013, thus exceeding the total for Western 
states ($46 billion). The largest investments 
likely originate from Saudi Arabia, the UAE 
and Kuwait. Several prominent business 
groups from those three countries main-
tain their own subsidiaries in Egypt. For 
the three Gulf monarchies, supporting the 
Egyptian military therefore represents an 
insurance policy for existing investments. 
The enormous sums of aid also smooth the 
way for future investments in the poten-
tially lucrative Egyptian market. 
This connection became particularly 
clear last March, when al-Sisi, then still 
defence minister, signed a framework 
agreement for a gigantic construction 
project with the UAE’s largest listed con-
struction company: In the coming five 
years Arabtec intends to build one million 
housing units on a land area of over 160 
million square metres. The land is to be 
provided free of charge by the Egyptian 
military. This deal suggests that a not in-
considerable proportion of the transferred 
billions could ultimately flow back to the 
Gulf via this kind of major project. 
The Egyptian Military 
Regardless of whether al-Sisi sought the 
highest office of state as the candidate of 
the generals or on his own account, he will 
be reliant on future support of the power-
ful military leadership. Since the fall of 
Mubarak in 2011 the generals have succes-
sively expanded the dominant role of the 
army not only in politics but especially in 
Egypt’s economy. A central role is played 
by the military’s own business empire. The 
numerous military-run companies offer 
lucrative posts for serving and retired 
officers, while the jobs they provide rein-
force the dependency of large parts of the 
Egyptian population on the armed forces. 
The army accounts for between 5 and 40 
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 percent of GDP according to various esti-
mates – the huge lack of transparency 
makes it impossible to provide more exact 
figures. The new Egyptian constitution 
adopted at the beginning of January 2014 
in fact legally entrenches this transparency 
deficit, with the military budget to be ne-
gotiated in a National Defence Council 
dominated by the military and presented 
to parliament only as an overall sum. 
Since the revolution of 2011, but above 
all since the military coup in mid-2013, a 
significant increase in construction activity 
by the army has been observed. According 
to media reports, state infrastructure con-
tracts to the tune of more than $1 billion 
were awarded to the military without com-
petitive tendering between September and 
November 2013 alone. The government has 
given various major projects to the Army 
Corps of Engineers, including the planning 
for a high-speed rail network and infra-
structure development at the site for 
Egypt’s first nuclear reactor. The armed 
forces also capitalises on their control over 
agricultural and building land. It must be 
assumed that private companies purchas-
ing state land must often pay considerable 
sums to the armed forces. If a company 
like Arabtec receives building land for free, 
profit-sharing with the military through 
sub-contracts or direct stakes is likely to be 
assured. 
The Egyptian Business Elite 
Their oligopolistic position in parts of the 
Egyptian economy and extensive domestic 
and foreign networks also make the nation-
al business elite an indispensable strategic 
partner for al-Sisi. Major business figures 
were already a driving force in the summer 
2013 campaign to remove Morsi. They sup-
ported the campaign that led to the presi-
dent’s removal directly with money, but 
above all through the media they control. 
In particular entrepreneurs with interests 
in the construction and property sectors, 
and related construction materials indus-
tries, placed their hopes in a new president 
from the ranks of the armed forces. Like the 
investors from the three Gulf states, with 
whom they often maintain close business 
relationships, they feared that Morsi would 
encourage scrutiny of their business activi-
ties during the Mubarak era, especially in 
relation to land purchases. 
The business elite’s support for al-Sisi 
already appears to be paying off. Although 
the military has been able to expand its 
business empire during recent months, 
large private-sector companies also seem 
to benefit. The Egyptian stock market has 
boomed since the coup: The benchmark 
EGX30 rose by more than 65 percent by 
May 2014, while the sectoral index for 
property companies almost doubled. How-
ever, this reflects less the current earnings 
situation of the businesses than market 
expectations that al-Sisi will win the presi-
dency and the state/private sector networks 
created during the Mubarak era will sur-
vive. These networks represent another 
avenue by which property companies could 
profit from the planned major projects, 
whether as partners or as sub-contractors. 
Population at Large Losing Out 
Al-Sisi’s “visions” will do nothing to im-
prove the precarious living conditions of 
most Egyptians. History shows that major 
construction projects often ignore the 
needs of the population. For example, in 
view of the housing vacancy rate it is ques-
tionable whether the country really needs 
one million new homes. A constructive 
policy to legalise the informal settlements 
that have appeared on the margins of the 
major conurbations in recent decades 
would appear more urgent. 
Even more dubious than the concrete 
benefit of such projects is the way they are 
plainly conceived as a substitute for over-
due structural economic reforms. The re-
form agenda would include, for example, 
the IMF’s insistent demand to restructure 
the subsidy system, which is most favour-
able to the top income groups and energy-
intensive industries. Al-Sisi has generally 
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 turned down such reforms, at least in 
the short term, apparently worried about 
losing important groups of voters and 
supporters. Egypt also needs a strengthen-
ing of market oversight and greater trans-
parency in state economic activity. In both 
these fields the country is currently moving 
backwards. In January the procedures for 
awarding state contracts were significantly 
simplified, in many cases now allowing 
them to be awarded to firms without com-
petitive tendering. And amendments to the 
investment law passed in April will place 
obstacles in the way of challenging con-
tracts between state instances and private 
investors in court. The change also applies 
retroactively, and is likely to lead to the 
dropping of numerous corruption cases 
opened since 2011. 
Outlook 
Al-Sisi’s development plans illustrate the 
fundamental dilemma that will face his 
presidency. To consolidate his power he 
draws on the support of groups whose 
interests are in important respects incom-
patible with the reforms required for the 
country’s economy. But if state repression 
intensifies without economic development 
benefiting the broad population, renewed 
protests are likely. In that event it must 
be expected that political resistance will 
become increasingly radicalised. 
Germany and the European Union have 
very limited influence on current develop-
ments in Egypt, as financial assistance 
from the three Gulf monarchies makes the 
country largely independent of Western 
development funding in the short term. 
But in view of Egypt’s precarious budgetary 
situation, even the Gulf billions will not 
suffice to turn the economy around. So in 
the medium term the West could regain its 
leverage. 
Future economic cooperation with Egypt 
should prioritise budget consolidation as 
outlined in the IMF support plan. If the 
European Union supplies budget support 
it must include, as recommended by the 
European Court of Auditors, stricter con-
ditionality in relation to human rights than 
has been the case in the past. At the state 
level Germany and the European Union 
should do considerably more to promote 
budgetary transparency and effective 
market oversight. Here cooperation with 
carefully selected Egyptian institutions is 
recommended, such as the hitherto tooth-
less Central Auditing Organisation and 
the Egyptian Competition Authority. 
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